What it is
RFC 9147 specifies Datagram Transport Layer Security version 1.3. It adapts TLS 1.3 security to datagram transport, commonly UDP. A datagram is an individual message that may be lost, duplicated, or delivered out of order.
DTLS protects communication between two endpoints without turning it into a reliable, ordered stream. Its handshake establishes security parameters and keys; its record layer protects subsequent traffic. Application data still needs its own delivery and freshness rules.
Who it applies to
The specification applies to implementations and services that choose DTLS 1.3. For an automotive project, relevant participants can include ECU software suppliers, platform teams, security architects, and engineers integrating vehicle-to-backend services.
It is not an automotive regulation or a blanket requirement to encrypt every UDP service. Applicability comes from the selected communication architecture, service specification, or customer contract. A project should identify the actual endpoints: protection ends wherever the DTLS connection terminates.
What it covers
The document defines the changes needed to operate TLS-style security over datagrams, including handshake retransmission, fragmentation and reassembly, record sequencing, acknowledgements, and key updates. It also addresses denial-of-service countermeasures and connection IDs.
| Mechanism | Engineering significance |
|---|---|
| Handshake retransmission | Connection establishment can recover from lost handshake traffic. |
| Fragmentation and reassembly | Handshake messages can span multiple datagrams. |
| Record sequence information | Receivers can process records despite loss or reordering. |
| Connection IDs | Security state can be identified independently of the current transport address. |
Replay handling deserves explicit review. Do not assume that encrypted traffic automatically provides the command freshness, duplicate suppression, or ordering required by an application.
How it fits with other documents
RFC 8446, TLS 1.3, is the foundation: RFC 9147 describes the datagram-specific adaptations and must be read alongside it. RFC 9147 obsoletes RFC 6347, which specified DTLS 1.2; this does not mean an installed DTLS 1.2 endpoint automatically supports DTLS 1.3.
RFC 9853 updates RFC 9147 with a return-routability check for connection-ID use. It provides a mechanism to validate a peer address before updating the address binding, helping address denial-of-service risks around address changes.
For automotive engineering, treat DTLS as one technical control within the cybersecurity architecture. Separately establish service authorization, credential provisioning, and any safety communication measures.
In practice
Start with a written service profile. Specify the required DTLS version, authentication method, trust material, cryptographic configuration, and failure behavior. Confirm interoperability between the actual client and server implementations rather than relying on a library’s general claim of DTLS support.
Test handshake completion under representative loss and reordering, certificate or key rejection, endpoint restart, and constrained packet sizes. If address changes are expected, test connection-ID behavior and the applicable address-validation mechanism together.
Measure startup delay, memory consumption, and processor load on the target ECU. Define what the application does while authentication is incomplete or the channel is unavailable. For commands, explicitly decide how stale or duplicate messages are detected and rejected. These integration decisions make the security properties useful to the vehicle service.